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Abstract 
Recent research into educational inequalities has shown the importance of 
decomposing social origins into parental class, status and education, representing 
economic, socio-cultural and educational family resources, respectively. But we 
know little about how inequalities in educational attainment at the micro-level map 
onto institutional characteristics of educational systems at the macro-level, if we treat 
social origins in a multidimensional way. Drawing on the rich over-time variation in 
educational systems in four European countries – Britain, Sweden, Germany and 
Italy – this paper develops and tests a number of hypotheses regarding the effects of 
various components of social origins on individuals’ educational attainment in 
different institutional contexts. It is evident from our results that a great deal of 
similarity exists across nations with different educational systems in the persisting 
importance for individuals’ educational attainment of parental class, status and 
education. But our findings also indicate that changes in the institutional features of 
educational systems have, in some instances although not in others, served to 
reinforce or to offset the social processes generating educational inequalities at the 
micro level. 
Key words: educational system, comparative research, social origins, educational 
attainment 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
Past research has shown that parental class, status and education have independent 
and distinctive effects on children’s educational attainment (Authors). Rather than 
representing interchangeable indicators of the same concept of ‘social origin’, the 
three components relate to different dimensions of social background and can be 
seen as influencing children’s educational attainment through particular 
mechanisms. In this paper we investigate the relevance of these components of social 
origins in a comparative setting, using longitudinal data from four European 
countries: Britain, Sweden, Germany and Italy. We choose a comparative approach 
because we aim to explore to what extent changes in the effects of the three 
components of social origins follow changes in the various properties of educational 
systems. The main objective is to match a multidimensional understanding of social 
origins with a multidimensional conceptualisation of educational institutions, and 
propose hypotheses regarding how far the different features of educational systems 
may reinforce or offset the effects of different components of social origins on 
individuals’ education.  
More specifically, we address the following research questions. (1) Do parental class, 
status and education have distinctive effects on individuals’ educational attainment, 
and if so, how far do these effects show up in a similar fashion in our four countries?  
(2) Do the effects of parental class, status and education on individuals’ educational 
attainment vary over time in the four countries, and if so, do they vary following 
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changes in features of countries’ educational systems? (3) To what extent do the 
effects of parental class, status and education, when taken together, differentiate 
individuals’ education, and do the combined effects of social origins differ in the four 
countries, depending on the characteristics of their educational systems?  
Regarding case selection, we were driven by the aim to maximise variation in the 
institutional dimensions we consider, while ensuring the availability of high-quality 
micro-data. Although educational systems in all four countries were characterised by 
elitism, strong selection and stratification in the aftermath of WWII, reforms of the 
1960s and 1970s introduced comprehensive education in Britain and Sweden, 
whereas the architecture of the German system largely remained untouched. Italy, in 
this respect, takes an intermediate position.  
Components of social origins 
We argue that in the study of social inequality it is necessary to distinguish between 
relational aspects, e.g. social class and status, and attributional aspects, e.g. education 
or income, and that these different aspects of social inequality need to be considered, 
both separately and in conjunction, if inequalities in educational attainment are to be 
understood. Each component of social origins captures different, even if correlated, 
resources that a family has available to support children’s education.  
We take parental class as indicating the extent of family economic resources (income, 
wealth and degree of economic security) available for the support of children’s 
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education. We would regard class as being a better indicator in this respect than 
parental income alone. This is because class can be shown to be associated not only 
with level of current income but also with differences in income security, short-term 
income stability and longer-term income prospects (Goldthorpe and McKnight 2006). 
Moreover, it has been shown that the increasing inequality in incomes over the past 
decades has occurred to a greater extent between rather than within social classes – at 
least in Britain and Italy (Williams 2013; Albertini 2013). 
Regarding parental status, we aim to capture the Weberian idea of status as being 
grounded in relations of perceived social superiority, equality and inferiority, as 
expressed in patterns of inclusion in and exclusion from more intimate forms of 
association and distinctive life-styles. We take parental status as indicating the extent 
of family socio-cultural resources available to support children’s education as through 
parents’ social contacts and networks and their cultural tastes and forms of cultural 
participation (cf. Chan 2010). 
Given that parental education will be included in our analyses together with parental 
class and parental status, we take it as indicating the extent of the specific educational 
resources that parents have available to help their children; e.g. their ability to create a 
favourable home-learning environment, including assistance with homework or 
preparation for exams, and to provide their children with informed guidance 
through the educational system in regard to choice of schools, subjects, courses and 
examinations to take (cf. Schütz et al. 2005). 
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Linking the effects of social origins to educational institutions 
Until recently the social science literature has predominantly focused on individual-
level determinants of educational attainment. But of late a growing number of 
studies investigate the link between various characteristics of educational systems 
and individuals’ educational outcomes (e.g. Van de Werfhorst and Mijs 2010; Bol and 
Van de Werfhorst 2013; Ansell and Lindvall 2013; Pfeffer 2015). One could argue that 
if institutional context were meaningless, one should find near-constancy in the 
association between social origins and educational attainment, and the effect of social 
origins should exhibit a uniform pattern across countries, which is not unequivocally 
the case (Pfeffer 2008). Insofar as institutions alter the costs and benefits associated 
with educational choices, and increase or decrease the probability of succeeding in a 
specific educational pathway, they constitute a potentially important mediating 
variable in accounting for the relationship between social origins and educational 
outcomes (Peter et al. 2010; Beblavy et al. 2013; West and Nikolai 2013).  
Here we focus on institutional arrangement at the (lower and upper) secondary level 
of education, as students spend most time at this level and the decision whether or 
not to carry on to upper secondary level is known to be a critical juncture in school 
careers. We take into account the three dimensions of educational systems, which 
have received most theoretical and empirical attention: stratification, 
decommodification and standardisation. 
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Stratification (Allmendinger 1989; Kerckhoff 2001) denotes the differentiation of the 
educational system into strata with varying degrees of permeability between these 
strata. It comprises two important sub-dimensions: tracking or streaming and 
selectivity. By tracking we mean separating students by academic ability into groups, 
classes and curriculum within a certain level of the school system. Tracking has been 
widely discussed in the literature (e.g. Ammermüller 2005; Brunello and Checchi 
2007; Hanushek and Ludger 2005) and has generally been viewed as reinforcing 
educational inequalities (Werfhorst and Mijs 2010). To explain this effect, past 
research (e.g. Pfeffer 2008, Le Donne 2014) has emphasised the link between parental 
education and tracking. Educated parents may use their strategic knowledge of 
educational pathways to guide their children through the system. We accept this but 
also see a potential association with parental status. High-status parents could use 
their connections and networks to provide their children with information about the 
potential labour-market returns of various qualifications, thereby enabling them to 
make optimal educational decisions in order to maintain the family’s social position 
and avoid downward mobility (Breen and Goldthorpe 1997). This mechanism is 
considered particularly relevant when it comes to decisions about upper secondary 
and tertiary education.  
Drawing on Gamoran (1992), we distinguish selectivity of educational paths as a 
second sub-dimension of stratification. We define selectivity as a mechanism to 
assign pupils to schools, based on their test scores and past academic performance. 
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Higher level of selectivity is, again, expected to reinforce the effects of parental status 
and education, but via different mechanisms. Parental education enables parents to 
provide a supportive home-learning environment and thus makes it easier for 
children to pass admission thresholds. Parental status furnishes cultural resources 
which, in turn, help improve children’s academic performance and pass admission 
thresholds. This effect is expected to be particularly pronounced if selection hinges 
on a child’s reproduction of cultural knowledge and mastering of an established 
culture générale.  
Decommodification as a dimension of educational systems denotes the extent to which 
education is provided by the state in the form of a public good, rather than being 
purchased as a private good on the market. We acknowledge that in all our four 
countries education is predominantly provided as a public good. However, the 
extent and the quality of public education critically hinges on the allocation of 
financial resources, which varies a great deal both across time and across countries. 
More specifically, we deem three sub-dimensions of decommodification to be 
particularly important. First, if the level of public expenditures on education is low, 
higher class parents may use their financial resources to purchase private education 
in the form of tutoring or various extra-curricular activities, thus supplementing low-
quality public education (Ammermüller 2005; Schlicht et al. 2010). Second, higher 
class parents may decide to ‘opt out’ of the public system entirely if private 
education offers high-quality alternatives to public education (Busemeyer and 
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Iversen 2014). Third, in systems where access to tertiary education is associated with 
considerable direct costs, the availability of economic resources to pay for these fees 
is expected to influence whether or not students enrol in higher education. In sum, 
decommodification is expected to offset the effect of parents’ unequal endowment 
with economic resources and, hence, the effect of parental class, on educational 
attainment.  
Standardisation characterises the degree to which educational systems follow 
common, nation-wide standards and are controlled by central government as 
opposed to local authorities or by schools themselves. While tests of the effect of 
standardisation on attainment have yielded mixed results (Pfeffer 2008; Werfhorst 
and Mijs 2010), we expect three aspects of standardisation – budget making, 
examination and curriculum – to modify the effects of social origins in the following 
ways. To the extent that decentralised budget-making means that school budgets rely 
on local taxes, the economic profile of the local community and, by extension, the 
class profile of parents affects the resources available to schools (Gingrich and Ansell 
2014). This, in turn, results in better-equipped schools and better learning 
environments, such as smaller class sizes in more affluent neighbourhoods 
(Kerckhoff 1995; Krueger 2003; Wößmann 2003). In addition, decentralised budget 
making opens the door at the local level for parental lobbying, which enables higher 
status parents to use their networks and connections to channel funding towards 
elite tracks of the educational system. Parental lobbying can also be important 
10 
 
regarding examinations. In contexts where examinations are set by local authorities 
or schools, high-status parents may employ their lobbying potential to strategically 
shape the type and content of exams, tilting them towards their own socio-cultural 
characteristics and thus favouring their children’s success. In sum, stronger 
standardisation is expected to offset the effects of parental class and status. 
Regarding parental education, centralised examinations may in fact reinforce its 
effect on individuals’ education, as it would be easier for highly educated parents to 
use their strategic knowledge of the education system and their own experience with 
exams to advance their children’s education.  
Educational institutions across the four countries 
With a time frame spanning six decades (1950s until 2000s), comparing educational 
systems across four countries is a daunting task. Unlike recent studies that have 
analysed educational institutions in a shorter time-frame (e.g. Le Donné 2014), this 
study cannot rely on easily accessible indicators. Moreover, while some aspects of 
education, such as spending, easily lend themselves to quantification, other 
institutional features necessitate a more qualitative assessment based on case studies, 
historical narratives and other secondary accounts. We therefore rely on a number of 
country-specific sources to measure the properties of the educational systems we are 
interested in. To ensure the comparability of our indicators over time, we code every 
sub-dimension of stratification, decommodification and standardisation on an 
ordinal scale, ranging from low (=0) to high (=1), for every decade since the 1950s. 
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Depending on the level of detail of each indicator, the ordinal scale is either a 5-point 
or a 3-point scale. Since we do not attribute a particular weight to any specific sub-
dimension, we take the average to derive an overall indicator for each decade1. Table 
A1 in the Appendix summarises the indicators we use. 
Starting with our stratification index, we measure the extent of tracking in an 
educational system by taking into account both the number of tracks and the 
duration of tracking at the secondary level. We then map the extent of tracking onto 
a 5-point scale as shown in Table A2. We in fact attribute a greater importance to 
duration of tracking than the number of tracks, considering that earlier tracking has a 
more long-lasting impact on students’ educational attainment. As for selectivity, we 
follow a similar procedure by taking into account whether access to upper secondary 
education is based on academic performance assessed by tests, and whether specific 
tracks within upper secondary education are restricted to high-performing students. 
We also take into account the fact that there might be more than one entry barrier to 
upper secondary education. For instance, selection could take place both at the end of 
primary and lower secondary education. Overall, we deem the first criterion – 
general accessibility – to be more important, as such entry barriers bifurcate the 
student population into those with and without access. The coding rules are shown 
in Table A2. 
Regarding decommodification, we work with four indicators. Total spending on public 
education and spending specifically on secondary education, both as a share of GDP, 
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capture a country’s commitment to providing high-quality education as a public 
good. The percentage of privately educated students at the secondary level measures 
to what extent parents can opt out of public education in favour of a, supposedly, 
higher-quality private alternative. Finally, we also take into consideration the direct 
costs of attending tertiary education in the form of tuition fees. Although this 
indicator captures a feature of tertiary rather than secondary education, the costs of 
higher education influence parents’ and students’ decisions about whether or not to 
pursue upper secondary education; this is why we include it in the 
decommodification index. 
To map the interval-scale data on spending and private education onto a 5-point 
ordinal scale, we first use a logistic function to fit the raw data in-between 0 and 1, 
with a cross-over point of 0.5 at the medium level (Ragin 2008). This medium level 
reflects the OECD average for total education spending, secondary education 
spending and spending on private education. The upper and lower boundaries 
reflect spending levels of the top and bottom three OECD countries, or, in the case of 
private education, the share of the most heavily privatised and exclusively public 
education systems. The logistically transformed values were then rounded to map 
onto a 5-point scale. Regarding the direct costs of attending tertiary education, we 
coded the country decades according to the level of annual tuition fees relative to the 
annual disposable household income. The coding rules are displayed in Table A3.  
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Regarding standardisation, we use three indicators. First, we code whether budget 
making for primary and secondary education takes place at the local, central, or a 
mixed intermediate level. Second, we assess the degree of standardisation of 
examinations and tests, ranging from unstandardised, through partly standardised, 
to fully standardised. Third, we consider the standardisation of school curricula, 
again on the same 3-point ordinal scale. Using secondary accounts, we qualitatively 
code these dimensions for each country-decade following the coding rules shown in 
Table A4. 
Our measurements of the three dimensions of educational systems, as shown in 
Figure 1, reveal an interesting picture of institutional variation over the last six 
decades in all four countries2.   
[Figure 1] 
The British case is characterised by a gradual elimination of selectivity and tracking. 
Regarding decommodification, the pattern is bell-shaped, driven by increasing 
outlays for education in the 1960s and 1970s, followed by declining spending levels 
and the introduction of university tuition fees in the late 1990s. The British system 
initially featured a very low level of standardisation, owing to mixed local-central 
budget making, decentralised examinations and the absence of a national 
curriculum. But the introduction of a national curriculum and the gradual 
standardisation of examinations starting in the 1980s changed the character of the 
British education, from a largely decentralised to a mostly centralised system.  
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The Swedish case resembles the British in that public education turned from a highly 
selective, early tracked system to a largely untracked, highly permeable one (Erikson 
and Jonsson 1996). However, education in Sweden still retained a higher degree of 
selectivity and tracking, insofar as students are streamed into different upper 
secondary tracks at the end of lower secondary education, and access to specific 
tracks is based on students’ average grade points (Rudolphi 2013). Institutional 
reforms were accompanied by a marked increase of public expenditures on 
education, in particular from the 1960s until the 1980s, which is reflected in the rapid 
rise of our decommodification index. Private education has historically been very 
low in Sweden, but there was some increase in the 2000s. Regarding standardisation, 
Sweden switched from a rather unstandardised to a rather standardised system, due 
to the 1962 educational reform, which introduced a national curriculum and 
standardised examinations.  
In marked contrast, the German educational system has not changed significantly 
(Schneider 2006), and its highly stratified nature has remained a constant feature 
since the early 1950s (Neugebauaer et al. 2013). Differentiation into a number of 
different tracks occurs early. To gain access to upper secondary education, students 
normally need to attend the Gymnasium. In this transition process, teachers’ 
recommendations function as a key selection mechanism. But it should be noted that 
these recommendations are binding in only one third of all federal states. Moreover, 
selection continues even within the Gymnasium insofar as students may be required, 
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chiefly because of poor grades, to move to other school types. Overall, the German 
system has more than one de facto selection barrier, which would yield a selectivity 
score of 1 (very high). However, considering that the teacher recommendation is not 
binding in all federal states, we code selectivity at 0.75 (high). Regarding 
decommodification, the German pattern resembles the British in that spending levels 
generally increased from low levels, followed by a gradual decline since the 1970s. 
Although university tuition fees were abolished in the 1970s, they were reintroduced 
by some federal states in the 2000s. However, by 2012 this experiment had been 
abandoned. Regarding standardisation, centralised budget making at the 
Bundesländer level and a standardised curriculum have both been persistent features 
of the German educational system.  
Finally, Italy has an educational system that occupies a middle position on all three of 
the dimensions we have distinguished. The country started with a highly elitist 
system in the 1950s where access to upper secondary education was based on 
academic performance and parental income (OECD 1969). In the early 1960s, 
educational reform eliminated the entrance barriers to upper secondary education 
(Barone 2009), and also reduced the degree of tracking in secondary education in 
general, although at the upper secondary level some de facto academic versus 
vocational tracking still exists (Barone and Schizzerotto 2008). Regarding 
decommodification, educational spending first climbed up from very low post-WWII 
levels, and private education gradually declined. However, since the 1970s there 
16 
 
have been no further significant improvements in these respects. Moreover, 
university fees were raised in the 1990s, although their level remained rather low 
(Brunello et al. 2000). As for standardisation, Italian education has historically been 
highly standardised, with the central government having ultimate control over 
exams, curriculum and the budget. However, standardisation recently declined 
somewhat in the wake of a devolution process granting limited budget making 
competences to the regional level.  
Hypotheses 
In Table 1 we show the links that we envisage between the effects of our three 
dimensions of social origins on individuals’ educational attainment and our three 
dimensions of educational systems. Taking these links together with the over-time 
change in the latter, as indicated in Figure 1, we can now formulate hypotheses about 
the expected changes in the effects of social origins in our four countries. The 
hypotheses are summarised in Table 2. We should highlight that the expected effects 
are stylised representations of complex social processes, in which social origins effects 
on educational attainment are likely to be influenced by a number of intermediating 
conditions apart from that of educational institutions, on which we here focus. 
 [Tables 1 and 2] 
Regarding the effect of parental class, based on our decommodification and 
standardisation indices, we do not expect a sustained decline in any of our four 
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countries. For Britain and Sweden, an overall and fairly sharp decline is expected, 
but without much change in recent decades. For Germany and Italy, we hypothesise 
a moderate decline of the importance of parental class, but only for the earlier 
decades – based on the reverse U-shaped trend in decommodification and persistent 
and strong standardisation.  
Regarding the effect of parental status, we expect a sustained decline in Britain – due 
to the sharp drop in the strength of our stratification index and a marked increase in 
the strength of our standardisation index in recent decades. A decline is expected in 
Sweden too, although with little change in recent decades, in accordance with the 
stability in stratification and standardization scores. In Germany, no change is 
expected, again, because of the relative stability of the two dimensions of the 
educational system that are thought likely to modify the parental status effect. For 
Italy, we expect only a moderate decline of the importance of parental status chiefly 
because of the drop in the stratification scores in the 1950s and 1960s being offset by 
strong standardisation throughout the whole period covered. 
Regarding the effect of parental education, we again take the stratification and the 
standardisation dimensions of the educational system as most relevant. In Britain, we 
thus expect a fairly sharp decline of the effect, followed by relative stability. In 
Sweden and Germany, the effect of parental education is expected to be persistent. In 
Italy, we hypothesise a moderate decline, followed by relative stability.  
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Finally, we would expect that when all three components of social origins are taken 
together, their combined effect on individuals’ educational attainment will decline 
fairly sharply in Britain and Sweden, but rather moderately in Italy. For Germany, 
we would expect only a minimal, if any, reduction.   
Data and variables 
The British data are taken from three birth-cohort studies: the MRC Survey of Health 
and Development, the National Child Development Study and the British Cohort 
Study. The studies follow children born in one week in 1946, 1958 and 1970, 
respectively, through their lives. The Swedish data come from four longitudinal 
studies on pupils born in 1948, 1953, 1967 and 1972, respectively. The studies, 
conducted by the University of Gothenburg, selected a representative sample of 10% 
of all pupils reaching Grade 6, that is, at around age 13. Data for Germany are taken 
from the adult cohort of the German National Educational Panel Study, which 
includes individuals born between the mid-1940s and the late-1980s. Based on a 
multi-cohort design, the NEPS contains detailed retrospective monthly information 
on respondents’ educational trajectories and family histories. For our purposes, we 
group the respondents into three birth cohorts spanning the years 1945-54, 1955-54 
and 1965-74. Since the institutional background of East Germans’ education was very 
different from the one described above, we include individuals born in West 
Germany only (hereafter ‘Germany’). As for the Italian data, we rely on the 2005 
Italian section of EU-SILC. The dataset includes individuals born between 1939 and 
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1988 and provides information on educational attainment and parental background. 
For our purposes, we selected a sub-sample of respondents born between 1939 and 
1975 and grouped them into three birth cohorts: 1939-53, 1954-64 and 1965-75. The 
cut-off points for the cohorts align with the institutional changes noted in the Italian 
educational system.  
In all countries, we only include into our analyses those respondents for whom we 
have complete information on all variables described below3.  
We measure educational attainment – our dependent variable – at some point 
between ages 35 and 40, which maximises the chances that individuals have attained 
their highest possible qualification. We focus on two ‘educational thresholds’: first, 
that which divides a high level of attainment at secondary level (at least) from any 
lower attainment; and second, that which divides tertiary level education from any 
lower attainment. The distribution of individuals according to the two thresholds is 
displayed in Table A7.  
The main points to emerge from this table are the following. First, in each country we 
see a significant growth in the numbers attaining the upper secondary threshold. 
Second, expansion at the tertiary threshold has been more sluggish and 
predominantly benefited women. Third, in the latest cohort, women either outstrip 
men in terms of attainment (Sweden, Italy) or are at least on par with men (Britain, 
Germany). 
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Our explanatory variables are parental class, status and education. For Britain and 
Sweden, information on these variables was collected when children were aged 10-11 
and 7-13, respectively. In the German and Italian surveys the parental variables are 
based on retrospective information from respondents and refer to when respondents 
were age 15 (Germany) and 14 (Italy). In constructing the parental background 
variables, our aim has been to reflect the national situation as closely as possible, 
rather than working with nominally identical indicators.  
Regarding parental class, we use the National Statistics Socio-Economic 
Classification (NS-SEC) for Britain, the Erikson-Goldthorpe-Portocarero (EGP) 
scheme for Sweden and Germany (Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992) and the European 
Socio-economic Classification (ESeC) (Rose and Harrison 2014) for Italy. It is 
important to note that all three classifications have the same theoretical basis. In 
Britain, Sweden and Italy, we use the dominance approach of class allocation 
(Erikson 1984); i.e. we choose the class category of the parent working full-time or, if 
both parents work full-time, we choose the higher category. In Germany, given that 
in the cohorts in question mothers rarely worked, let alone in higher classes than 
fathers, the default is to use the father’s class, save for individuals for whom this 
information is missing, in which case we use the mother’s class.  
Regarding parental status, we use national versions of the CAMSIS scale (Prandy 
and Lambert 2003) for Sweden, Germany and Italy. The CAMSIS scale is based on 
the occupational structure of marriages and uses multidimensional scaling to derive 
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scores. For Britain, we use the status order developed by Chan and Goldthorpe 
(2004), which is based on the occupational structure of close friendship. Like the 
CAMSIS scale, the Chan-Goldthorpe scale uses multidimensional scaling to derive 
status scores.4 We used the dominance approach for all four countries to construct 
parental status scores. To facilitate comparison across cases, status scores are 
standardised between 0 and 1, with higher scores indicating higher status. 
Regarding parental education, we use seven ordered categories for each country. 
While these categories reflect the specificities of the respective educational systems, 
they all capture the key qualification thresholds at the upper secondary and tertiary 
level, and are thus broadly comparable. For Britain, Germany and Italy, the variable 
represents parents’ qualifications considered in combination, while in the Swedish 
case parental education represents the level of education of the parent who attained 
the higher qualification. Given that our study spans several decades in which the 
distribution of education markedly changed, we prefer a relative measure of parental 
education. We therefore score parental education according to the proportion of 
parents falling below a specific category in the cumulative distribution for their 
children’s cohort. Representing a proportion, the resulting measure ranges from 0 to 
1. Summary statistics showing the distributions of each parental variable are 
available in Table A85.  
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Results 
Since we do not have detailed data on the educational pathways that respondents 
followed, we could not use educational transition models (cf. Breen and Jonsson 
2000). We therefore use binary logistic regression models with the two educational 
thresholds indicated above as dependent variables and the three parental 
background indicators as explanatory variables. A similar approach was taken by 
(Authors)6. The models also include cohort dummies and are estimated separately by 
country for men and women.  
When in the following sections we talk about the ‘effects’ of our explanatory 
variables, it should be noted that we intend this in a purely statistical sense and do 
not suppose that we are establishing causal relationships. The most we would claim 
is that insofar as our results are in line with the hypotheses we have set out, indirect 
support at least is given to the causal processes or mechanisms implied by these 
hypotheses. 
Do parental class, status and education have independent effects? 
Our first research question asks whether parental class, status and education have 
independent effects in each country and whether these effects show up in a similar 
fashion across countries. We present our findings in graphic form in Figure 2. The full 
results are shown in tabular form in Tables A9 and A10. The graphs display the net 
average marginal effects (AMEs) of social origins on the likelihood of exceeding or 
not the upper secondary and the tertiary thresholds. Considering that parental class 
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is a categorical variable, in order to demonstrate its effect, we plot the class exhibiting 
the highest net AME in comparison to the class of routine wage-workers.7  
[Figure 2] 
The graphs for men and women alike bring out the importance of all three 
dimensions of parental background in all four countries. With few exceptions, 
parental class, status and education exert distinctive significant effects on men’s and 
women’s educational attainment. But the findings also reveal that the dimensions of 
parental background matter somewhat differently across countries. Specifically, 
parental class effects are clearly stronger in Britain and Sweden than in Germany and 
Italy. A reverse pattern then shows up for parental status and education. These latter 
components of social origins apparently matter more in Germany and Italy than in 
the other two countries. For instance, in Italy the effect of parental education on the 
probability of exceeding the upper secondary threshold is about twice as large as in 
Britain and Sweden. A further finding is that the effects of social origins, especially 
the effects of parental status and education, are greater for the upper secondary than 
for the tertiary threshold – thus confirming that in all four countries upper secondary 
education is a critical juncture in educational careers.  
Do the effects of parental class, status and education vary over time? 
Our second research question is about time variation in the effects of the three 
components of social origins and the differences in this variation across countries. 
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We are interested to see whether or not such variation is aligned with what we have 
hypothesised in the light of macro-level changes in educational systems. To bring out 
changes in the effects of the three parental variables over time, we focus on the 
differences in the predicted probabilities – based on our logistic regression models  – 
of exceeding or not our two education thresholds for individuals from most 
advantaged and least advantaged backgrounds – i.e. the overall ‘attainment gap’. 
The construction rules for assigning each parental variable to one of three levels, 
representing either the most advantaged or the least advantaged or an intermediate 
level are detailed in Table A11. We then consider the effects of each parental variable 
in turn, while holding the other two parental variables constant at the intermediate 
level. Given very similar results for men and women, we average the predicted 
probabilities across gender and show the combined probabilities in single graph in 
Figure 38.  
[Figure 3] 
For parental class, we find evidence of a sustained decline of the effect in Italy and 
Germany, in the case of the upper secondary but not for the tertiary threshold. In 
Britain there is no significant change in the effect of parental class for either 
threshold; in Sweden there is even some strengthening of the effect for the latest 
cohort, at least for the upper secondary threshold. With regard then to our 
hypotheses, the outcome is mixed. The results for Italy and Germany at the upper 
secondary levels are, for the earlier cohorts at least, in line with our expectations, but 
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while for Britain and Sweden we expected a weakening influence of parental class 
for the earlier cohorts, this is not apparent. 
Turning to the effects of parental status, we observe a sustained decline for both 
thresholds in Sweden and a marked decline in Britain for the upper secondary 
threshold. In Germany, the parental status effect remains constant at the upper 
secondary level but there is a decrease at the tertiary level. In Italy, there is no change 
at either threshold. These results are then broadly in line with our hypotheses, so far 
as Britain and Sweden are concerned. For Germany, our expectation – persistence of 
the parental status effect – is only supported at the upper secondary level. For Italy, 
where we envisaged a moderate decline of the importance of parental status, we in 
fact found overall stability.     
Regarding parental education, we find a strengthening effect across the cohorts in 
Britain and Sweden – in Britain the pattern is V-shaped but with the effect being 
much stronger in the latest than in the earliest cohort. These results go contrary to 
our expectations of persistence in Sweden and first decline and then stability in 
Britain. But for Germany, our hypotheses are fully supported: parental education has 
a persistent effect on individuals’ educational attainment. The L-shaped pattern in 
Italy also aligns with our expectation; i.e. the importance of parental education 
declines sharply between the first and the second cohorts and then levels out. 
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Are the combined effects of social origins different in the four countries? 
Our third research question concerns the combined effect of the three social origin 
variables and asks to what extent this effect has changed across cohorts within 
countries, and how far these changes map onto changes in the countries’ educational 
systems. To address this issue, we follow the same approach as above: i.e. we plot the 
difference in the predicted probabilities of exceeding or not our two educational 
thresholds, for individuals from consistently advantaged and consistently 
disadvantaged backgrounds when all three dimensions of parental background are 
considered together.  
We assign respondents to different categories of social origins according to the 
derivation rules shown in Table A12. Briefly, we assign respondents to the consistently 
disadvantaged category if at least two out of the three components of parental 
background are at the most disadvantaged level; and likewise, respondents are 
assigned to the consistently advantaged category if at least two out of the three 
components are at the most advantaged level. All other respondents are categorised 
as intermediate. Having derived these social origin categories, we then compare the 
predicted probabilities of exceeding or not our two educational thresholds for 
individuals from consistently advantaged backgrounds with those for individuals 
from consistently disadvantaged backgrounds. Figure 4 graphs these attainment gaps 
for men and women combined.  
[Figure 4] 
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The figure reveals two points of main interest. First, so far as the size of the combined 
effects is concerned, our four countries appear to form two groups: the effects are 
clearly stronger in Germany and Italy than in Britain and Sweden. For instance, in 
the latest cohort, the attainment gap between individuals from consistently 
advantaged and consistently disadvantaged origins in exceeding the tertiary 
threshold is around 40 percentage points in Italy and Germany as compared to 30 
percentage points in Britain and 20 percentage-points in Sweden.  
Second, so far as cross-cohort changes are concerned, the results are for the most part 
in line with our expectations, as shown in the last column of Table 2, so far as the 
upper secondary threshold is concerned. There is a sharp decline in the combined 
origins effect in Italy, a moderate decline in Britain and Sweden, while in Germany 
there is not much change. However, when it comes to the tertiary threshold, a decline 
in the combined origins effects is far less apparent, even in Italy. 
 
Conclusions 
In this paper, we have built on previous research that argues for a more 
comprehensive understanding of social origins to fully appreciate their effects on 
individuals’ educational attainment. On this basis, we posed three research questions 
regarding the effects of three different components of social origins and their 
variation over time in four European countries. Further, we sought to link individual 
micro-level with institutional changes in the countries’ educational systems, and 
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have proposed a number of hypotheses about the variation of parental background 
effects over time, both within and across countries. Our results can be summarised as 
follows. 
First, it is apparent that all three components of social origin matter across the four 
countries. A multidimensional conceptualisation of social origins, such as the one 
proposed in this paper, thus seems necessary to fully capture the different sources of 
social inequalities in education. However, our results further suggest important 
differences between countries in terms of the specific components of social origins 
that matter most. In Britain and Sweden, parental class – i.e. family economic 
resources – appears to be a more important driving force behind educational 
inequalities than in Germany and Italy. In the latter two countries, parental status – 
i.e. socio-cultural endowments – and parental education – i.e. capacity to provide an 
effective home-learning environment and strategic knowledge of the educational 
system – play a greater role in children’s educational attainment than in Britain or 
Sweden.  
Second, we find that the effects of parental background on children’s educational 
attainment, and especially on the probability of their attaining upper secondary 
education, have been subject to important changes over time. Some, though by no 
means all, of these changes at the micro-level appear to be aligned with institutional 
changes in the countries’ educational systems. In Figure 5, to give a general picture, 
we overlay our hypothesised and the actually observed patterns of change in 
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educational inequalities in our four countries, averaging for this purpose the effects 
that apply at the upper secondary and tertiary thresholds. It can be seen that our 
hypotheses are most fully borne out in Germany, where we expected, and mainly 
found, rather little change. In the other three countries we tended to overestimate the 
magnitude, rather than the direction, of cross-cohort change. 
[Figure 5] 
It can also be seen that with our three components of social origins, we obtain the 
closest fit with our expectations in the case of parental status: that is, a clear decrease 
in its importance in Britain and Sweden and persistence, at least at the upper 
secondary level, in Germany. In Italy, somewhat unexpectedly though, we also 
found the parental status effect relatively stable across cohorts. In contrast, we 
overrated the potential of the decommodification of educational systems to reduce 
the parental class effects, especially for Britain and Sweden. With parental education, 
our expectations generally hold for Germany and Italy, but we miss the increasing 
importance of this component of social origins that can be observed in the British and 
the Swedish cases.  
Third, as regards the combined social origin effects, our expectations concerning a 
general decline are met most clearly in the case of Italy (cf. Triventi et al. 2015) and 
also, so far as earlier cohorts are concerned, for Sweden (cf. Breen and Jonsson 2007). 
With the other two countries, while some decline may have occurred at the upper 
secondary threshold, at the tertiary threshold social inequalities in educational 
30 
 
attainment appear very persistent (see further for Britain, Blanden and Macmillan 
2016, and for Germany, Blossfeld et al. 2015).  
Finally, as to the general question of the relative importance of micro-level and 
institutional effects on social inequalities in educational attainment, we might sum 
up our findings and their implications on the following lines. It is evident that a great 
deal of similarity exists across nations with different educational systems in the 
persisting importance for individuals’ educational attainment of parental class, status 
and education – even though cross-national differences are apparent in which of 
these components have the stronger effects. This variation may itself be related to 
institutional differences, and our findings do also indicate that changes in the 
institutional features of educational systems have, in some instances although not in 
others, served to reinforce or to offset the social processes generating educational 
inequalities at the micro level. 
The question that obviously arises is then that of what determines the extent to 
which institutional change is or is not influential. In this regard what is further 
suggested by our findings is that the crucial factor may be the extent to which 
institutional change does or does not ‘go with the grain’ of further change at the 
macro-level in the form and degree of social inequality. Thus, for instance, the 
decline in the importance of parental status on individuals’ educational attainment 
that we have observed in Britain and Sweden may result from the de-stratification 
and increasing standardisation of educational systems that is going together with a 
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generally declining importance of status stratification in society at large. In contrast, 
the persisting importance of parental class and the apparently rising importance of 
parental education, may reflect the fact that even where educational systems have 
been formally decommodified, such change has been countered by widening class 
inequalities, especially in regard to income levels and income security, so that 
parents with superior economic resources and a good knowledge of how the 
educational system actually works can still use these resources effectively to their 
children’s educational advantage. Future research, we would believe, could best be 
directed to exploring interactions between the micro- and macro-levels of the kind in 
question. 
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Table 1: Mechanisms that explain the link between effects of social origins at a micro-level 
and features of education systems at a macro-level 
 
 
 
 
 
parental class parental status parental education
Strong 
stratification
no hypothesis
reinforced                                  
via more information is 
available through networks, 
connections on economic 
returns to qualifications; more 
cultural resources to draw on 
to help with admissions and 
pass exams 
reinforced                                
via strategic knowledge of 
educational pathways; 
supporting home-learning 
environment to help with 
admissions and pass exams 
Strong 
decommodi-
fication
offset                                            
via reducing the role  of 
parents' economic 
resources 
no hypothesis no hypothesis
Strong 
standardization
offset                                   
via reduced importance of 
local taxes and thus parents' 
economic resources 
offset                                           
via fewer opportunities for 
parental lobbying to shape 
the type and content of 
exams/curriculum 
reinforced                                           
via more opportunities to use 
parents' own experience with 
educational systems/more 
opportunities to use strategic 
knowledge of education 
systems    
Effects of social originsFeatures of 
education 
systems
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Figure 1: Measures of the three dimensions of education systems 
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Table 2: Hypothesised effects of social origins on educational attainment over time 
 
parental class parental status parental education combined
Britain
first strenghtening 
and then weakening 
decommodification 
and first weak and 
then strong 
standardisation
sustained 
weakening of 
stratification and first 
weak and then 
strong 
standardisation
sustained weakening 
of stratification and 
first weak and then 
strong 
standardisation
Sweden
first strenghtening 
and then stable  
decommodification 
and strenghtening 
and then stable  
standardisation
weakening and then 
stable  stratification 
and strenghtening 
and then stable  
standardisation
weakening and then 
stable  stratification 
and strenghtening 
and stable  
standardisation
Germany
first strenghtening 
and then weakening 
decommodification 
and strong and stable  
standardisation
strong and stable  
stratification and 
strong and stable  
standardisation
strong and stable  
stratification and 
strong and stable  
standardisation
Italy
first strenghtening 
and then slightly 
reduced and stable  
decommodification 
and strong and 
relatively stable  
standardisation
weakening and then 
stable  stratification 
and strong and 
relatively stable 
standardisation
weakening and then 
stable  stratification 
and strong and 
relatively stable  
standardisation
Country
Effects of social origins
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Figure 2: Binary logistic regression of exceeding (or not) two educational thresholds, 
on parental class, status and education (average marginal effects in %) 
 
Men 
 
 
 
Women 
 
 
Note: (a): 95% confidence intervals are also shown. 
(b) Average marginal effects (AMEs) are calculated under a model that includes parental 
class, status and education along with cohort dummies. For parental class, the highest AME, 
in comparison with the class of routine/unqualified workers, is plotted. 
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Figure 3: Differences in probabilities between individuals most and least advantaged in terms 
of parental class, status and education of exceeding (or not) two educational thresholds (%) 
 
Notes: 
 (a): 95% confidence intervals are also shown. 
(b): Differences in predicted probabilities of exceeding the two educational thresholds are 
shown for each parental variable, holding the other two parental variables constant at the 
intermediate level.  
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Figure 4: Differences in probabilities between individuals with consistently advantaged and 
consistently disadvantaged origins of exceeding two education thresholds (%) 
 
 
Note: 
 (a): 95% confidence intervals are also shown. 
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Figure 5: Expected and observed effects of social origins compared 
 
Note: 
(a): Observed effects: average of the effects of social origins that apply at the upper secondary 
and tertiary thresholds. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Indicators used to construct indices for the three properties of educational systems 
 
Indicators 
Stratification 
    tracking  number of tracks at secondary level 
 
 duration of tracking at secondary level 
   selection  whether or not access to upper secondary is based on 
tests/grades at primary/lower secondary level 
 
 whether or not access to upper secondary is based on 
teachers' recommendations at primary/lower 
secondary level 
Decommodification 
   public expenditure  total spending on public education as % of GDP 
 
 total spending on secondary education as % of GDP 
  private education  % of students enrolled in private institutions at 
secondary level 
  
  direct costs of tertiary education 
 level of annual tuition fees as % of annual disposable 
household income 
Standardisation 
   budget making  whether budget made at local, central, or mixed level 
  examinations 
 whether examinations fully, partly, or not 
standardised 
  school curriculum 
 whether school curricula fully, partly, or not 
standardised 
 
 
 
Table A2: Coding rules for stratification 
Score Tracking Selectivity 
low (0) no tracking 
guaranteed progression, 
free access to all upper 
secondary tracks 
 
medium-low 
(0.25) 
tracking after lower 
secondary level and few 
tracks (≤ 2) 
guaranteed progression, 
restricted access to some 
upper secondary tracks 
 
medium 
(0.5) 
tracking after lower 
secondary level and many 
tracks (>2) 
limited progression (one 
selection barrier), free 
access to all upper 
secondary tracks 
 
medium-
high (0.75) 
tracking after primary level 
and few tracks  
limited progression (one 
selection barrier), restricted 
access to some upper 
secondary tracks  
 
high (1.0) 
tracking after primary level 
and many tracks 
limited progression (two or 
more selection barriers) 
 
 
 
 
Table A3: Coding rules for decommodification 
The decommodification score is derived by taking the average of its four sub-components, rounded 
up or down onto a five-point ordinal scale (low (0), medium-low (0.25), medium (0.5), medium-high 
(0.75), high (1)). Three sub-components (total education spending, secondary education spending, 
private education) are constructed using Ragin’s (2008) method of calibration, which uses logistic 
transformation to convert interval-scale variables onto a 0 to 1 scale. The fourth component (direct 
cost of tertiary education) is coded based on a manual coding of the cost of tuition relative to the 
disposable household income. In the following tables, we display the raw and the transformed data 
for the calibrated measures; for the cost of tertiary education, we display the coding rules.  
 
 
Table A3.1: Total education spending 
Raw data: Total education spending as % of GDP (average per decade) 
 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 
UK 3.10 4.34 5.45 5.06 4.91 5.38 
Sweden 2.18 6.80 7.73 7.37 7.40 7.00 
Germany  2.40 3.10 4.70 4.30 4.61 4.61 
Italy 2.72 4.51 4.90 4.80 4.57 4.59 
       
Calibrated data using Ragin’s (2008) method of calibration 
 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 
UK 0.18 0.39 0.59 0.51 0.49 0.58 
Sweden 0.03 0.86 1.00 0.97 0.98 0.90 
Germany  0.07 0.18 0.45 0.38 0.44 0.44 
Italy 0.12 0.42 0.48 0.47 0.43 0.43 
       
5-point ordinal scale 
 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 
UK Medium-
low 
Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium 
Sweden Low High High High High High 
Germany  Low Low Medium Medium Medium Medium  
Italy Low Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium 
Note: The thresholds for calibration are as follows: upper threshold 7.5 (average of top three OECD countries), 
cross-over point 5 (OECD average), lower threshold 2.5 (average of bottom three OECD countries).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A3.2: Secondary education spending 
Raw data: Total spending on secondary education as % of GDP (average per decade) 
 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 
UK 0.54 1.76 2.30 2.20 1.65 1.53 
Sweden 0.48 1.61 4.80 3.35 2.20 2.12 
Germany  0.76 1.07 2.40 2.30 1.89 1.78 
Italy 0.84 1.85 2.10 1.90 2.15 2.08 
       
Calibrated data using Ragin’s (2008) method of calibration 
 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 
UK 0.01 0.42 0.58 0.55 0.38 0.34 
Sweden 0.00 0.37 1.00 0.84 0.55 0.53 
Germany  0.09 0.19 0.60 0.58 0.46 0.43 
Italy 0.11 0.45 0.53 0.47 0.54 0.52 
       
5-point ordinal scale 
 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 
UK Low Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium-
low 
Sweden Low Medium High Medium-
high 
Medium Medium 
Germany  Low Medium-
low 
Medium Medium Medium Medium 
Italy Low Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium 
Note: The thresholds for calibration are as follows: upper threshold 4 (average of top three OECD countries), 
cross-over point 2 (OECD average), lower threshold 0.5 (average of bottom three OECD countries).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A3.3: Private education 
Raw data: Private education as % of secondary education (average per decade) 
 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 
UK 7.59 5.66 5.46 5 5.75 6.46 
Sweden 1.8 1.7* 1.3* 0.9 2.6 7.7 
Germany  2.64 3.13 3.52 5.44 6.14 6.74 
Italy 20.1* 20.1 0.15 10.6 9.7 9.7 
       
Calibrated data using Ragin’s (2008) method of calibration 
 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 
UK 0.38 0.28 0.27 0.25 0.29 0.323 
Sweden 0.09 0.08* 0.07* 0.05 0.13 0.385 
Germany  0.13 0.16 0.18 0.27 0.31 0.337 
Italy 1.00* 1.00 0.75* 0.53 0.49 0.485 
       
5-point ordinal scale 
 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 
UK Medium Medium-
low 
Medium-
low 
Medium-
low 
Medium-
low 
Medium-
low 
Sweden Low Low Low Low Low Medium 
Germany  Medium-
Low 
Medium- 
Low 
Medium- 
Low 
Medium- 
Low 
Medium- 
Low 
Medium- 
Low 
Italy High High Medium-
low 
Medium Medium Medium 
Note: The thresholds for calibration are as follows: upper threshold 20 (average of top three OECD countries), 
cross-over point 10 (OECD average), lower threshold 0 (average of bottom three OECD countries).  
* Values linearly imputed.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table A3.4: Private education 
Score Description 
high (1.0) no tuition fees 
medium-high (0.75)  tuition fees less than 5% of annual disposable household 
income 
medium (0.5) 
tuition fees between 5% and 10% of annual disposable 
household income 
medium-low (0.25) tuition fees between 10% and 15% of annual disposable 
household income 
low (0) tuition fees greater than 15% of annual disposable 
household income 
 
 
Table A4: Coding rules for standardisation 
Score Budget making Examinations Curricula 
low (0) local unstandardised unstandardised 
medium (0.5) local/central mix partly standardised partly standardised 
high (1.0) central standardised standardised 
 
 
 
Table A5: Scores for sub-dimensions of the three properties of educational systems 
  1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 
Stratification 
      Tracking 
          Britain 8, 12, 26  0.75 0.75 0.50 0.25 0.25 0.00 
    Sweden 5, 10, 22  0.75 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 
    Germany 13, 14  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
    Italy 1, 16, 19  1.00 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 
Selectivity 
          Britain 8, 26  1.00 0.75 0.50 0.25 0.25 0.00 
    Sweden 5, 10, 22  1.00 0.50 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 
    Germany 13, 14  0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 
    Italy 1, 16, 17  1.00 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
       Decommodification 
      Total spending on 
education  
          Britain 20  0.25 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 
    Sweden 15, 27, 28  0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
    Germany 4 0.00 0.25 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 
    Italy 15, 28  0.00 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 
Total spending on 
secondary education 
          Britain 15, 21, 28  0.00 0.50 0.75 0.75 0.50 0.25 
    Sweden 15, 27, 28  0.00 0.25 1.00 1.00 0.75 0.75 
    Germany 15, 28  0.00 0.00 1.00 0.75 0.25 0.25 
    Italy 15, 18  0.00 0.25 0.75 0.25 0.75 0.75 
Private education 
          Britain 3, 15  0.50 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 
    Sweden 6, 10  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 
    Germany 13  0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 
    Italy 6, 10, 19, 23  1.00 1.00 0.75 0.50 0.50 0.50 
Direct costs of 
tertiary education 
          Britain 8  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.25 
    Sweden 5, 22  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
    Germany 7, 9 0.25 0.75 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.75 
    Italy 1, 2, 11, 17, 19   1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.50 
 
 
 
Table A5: Cont. 
  1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 
Standardisation 
      Centralisation of 
budget making 
          Britain 8, 25, 26  0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 
    Sweden 5, 10, 22  0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 
    Germany 13, 24  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
    Italy 1, 16, 19  1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.50 0.50 
Centralisation of 
examinations 
          Britain 8, 26  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 1.00 1.00 
    Sweden 5, 10, 22 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
    Germany 13, 24 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 
    Italy 1, 16, 19  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Centralisation of 
school curriculum 
          Britain 8, 25, 26  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
    Sweden 5, 10, 22  0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
    Germany 24, 13  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
    Italy 1, 16, 19  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 
Sources:  
1. Barone, C. and A. Schizzerotto. 2008. The application of the ISCED-97 to Italy. In The 
International Standard Classification of Education: An Evaluation of Content and Criterion 
Validity for 15 European Countries, ed. Silke Schneider. Mannheim: MZES.  
2. Brunello G., Comi S. and Lucifora C. 2000. "The Returns to Education in Italy: A New Look 
at the Evidence", IZA DP No. 130.Department of Education. Statistics of Education. London: 
Department of Education.  
3. Diebolt, C. 2000. Long Memory Time Series and Fractional Integration: A Cliometric 
Contribution to French and German Economic and Social History. Historical Social Research 
15(3): 4–22.  
4. Erikson, Robert, and Jan O Jonsson. 1996. The Swedish Context: Educational Reform and 
Long-term Chance in Educational Inequality. In Can Education Be Equalized? The Swedish 
Case in Comparative Perspective, eds. Robert Erikson and Jan O Jonsson. Oxford: Westview 
Press.  
5. Eurostat. ‚Mean and median income by household type. EU-SILC survey‛ 
http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=ilc_di04&lang=en  
6. Federal Statistical Office. ‚Facts & Figures.‛ 
https://www.destatis.de/EN/FactsFigures/FactsFigures.html  
7. Gillard, D. 2014. Education in England. www.educationengland.org.uk.  
 
 
8. Göseke, Gerhard; Bedau, Klaus-Dietrich 1974, Verteilung und Schichtung der Einkommen 
der privaten Haushalte in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland von 1950 bis 1970. Berlin: 
Duncker & Humblot. 
9. Halldén, K. 2008. The Swedish educational system and classifying education using the 
ISCED-97. In The International Standard Classification of Education: An Evaluation of Content 
and Criterion Validity for 15 European Countries, ed. Silke Schneider. Mannheim: MZES.  
10. Italian Ministry of Education 2014. Rapporto sullo stato del sistema universitario e della ricerca 
2013, Rome.  
11. Jones, Ken. 2003. Education in Britain. Cambridge: Polity.  
12. Köhler, H., and P. Lundgreen. 2014. Allgemein bildende Schulen in der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland 1949-2010. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.  
13. Neugebauaer, M., D. Reimer, S. Schindler, and V. Stocké. 2013. Inequality in Transitions to 
Secondary and Tertiary Education in Germany. In Determined to Succeed?: Performance versus 
Choice in Edcuational Attainment, ed. Michelle Jackson. Stanford: Stanford University Press.  
14. OECD. ‚StatExtracts.‛ www.stats.oecd.org. 
15. OECD. 1969. Italy. Reviews of National Policies for Education. Paris: Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD).  
16. OECD. 1985. Educational Reforms in Italy. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD).  
17. OECD. 1992. Public Educational Expenditure, Costs and Financing : An Analysis of Trends 1970-
1988. Paris: OECD Publishing.  
18. OECD. 1998. Italy. Reviews of National Policies for Education. Paris: Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD).  
19. Office for Budget Responsibility. 2015. ‚Public Finances Databank.‛ 
www.budgetresponsibility.org.uk. 
20. Office for National Statistics. Annual Abstracts of Statistics. London: H.M.S.O.  
21. Rudolphi, F. 2013. Ever-Declining Inequalities? Transitions to upper Secondary and 
Tertiary Education in Sweden, 1972-1990 Birth Cohorts.In Determined to Succeed?: 
Performance versus Choice in Edcuational Attainment, ed. Michelle Jackson. Stanford: Stanford 
University Press.  
22. Scarangello, A. 1964. Progress and Trends in Italian Education. Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Department of Health and Welfare.  
23. Schneider, S. L. 2006. Applying the ISCED-97 to the German educational qualifications. In 
The International Standard Classification of Education: An Evaluation of Content and Criterion 
Validity for 15 European Countries, ed. Silke Schneider. Mannheim: MZES.  
24. Schneider, S. L. 2008. The application of the ISCED-97 to the UK ’ s educational 
qualifications. In The International Standard Classification of Education: An Evaluation of 
Content and Criterion Validity for 15 European Countries, ed. Silke L Schneider. Mannheim: 
MZES.  
25. Simon, B. 1999. Education and the Social Order. London: Lawrence & Wishart.  
26. Statistics Sweden. Statistical Yearbooks of Sweden. Stockholm: SCB.  
27. UNESCO. Statistical Yearbooks. Paris: UNESCO. [25] 
 
 
Table A6.1: Descriptive statistics for the whole and the analytical samples (%), BRITAIN 
  
Whole 
sample 
Analytical 
sample 
Cohort (%) 
  1946 16.3 17.8 
1958 43.7 41.0 
1970 40.1 41.3 
Missing 0.0 0.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 
   Gender (%) 
  Male 51.4 50.3 
Female 48.6 49.7 
Missing 0.0 0.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 
   Educational attainment (%) 
  Upper secondary or higher 28.9 29.5 
Tertiary 13.3 13.3 
Missing 0.0 0.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 
   Parental class [NS-SEC] (%) 
    higher managerial and professional occupations (Class 1) 8.6 8.4 
  lower managerial and professional occupations (Class 2) 17.9 18.5 
  intermediate occupations (Class 3) 11.5 12.9 
  small employers and own account workers (Class 4) 8.3 8.5 
  lower supervisory and technical occupations (Class 5) 19.8 21.8 
  routine and semi-routine occupations (Class 6-7) 27.0 30.0 
Missing 6.9 0.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 
   Parental status [0-1] 
    mean 0.45 0.45 
  s.d. 0.25 0.25 
Missing (%) 6.9 0.0 
   Parental education [0-1] 
    mean 0.38 0.37 
  s.d. 0.34 0.34 
Missing (%) 5.7 0.0 
   N 23666 20148 
 
 
 
Table A6.2: Descriptive statistics for the whole and the analytical samples (%), SWEDEN 
  
Whole 
sample 
Analytical 
sample 
Cohort (%) 
  1948 29.9 27.6 
1953 24.8 26.2 
1967 22.7 23.9 
1972 22.7 22.3 
Missing 0.0 0.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 
   Gender (%) 
  Male 51.2 50.9 
Female 48.8 49.1 
Missing  0.0 0.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 
   Educational attainment (%) 
  Upper secondary or higher 45.0 44.2 
Tertiary 16.5 17.5 
Missing  2.6 0.0 
   Parental class [EGP] (%) 
    higher salariat (I) 9.5 10.3 
  lower salariat (II) 16.3 17.3 
  routine non-manual employees (IIIa) 14.3 15.0 
  small employers and own account workers (IVabc) 15.0 15.0 
  lower supervisory and skilled manual workers (V+VI) 22.1 21.7 
  non-skilled workers (VIIab) 18.9 20.8 
Missing 3.9 0.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 
   Parental status [0-1] 
    mean 0.42 0.43 
  s.d. 0.15 0.16 
Missing (%) 3.9 0.0 
   Parental education [0-1] 
    mean 0.31 0.32 
  s.d. 0.34 0.34 
Missing (%) 6.6 0.0 
   N 32609 28741 
 
 
Table A6.3: Descriptive statistics for the whole and the analytical samples (%), GERMANY 
  
Whole 
sample 
Analytical 
sample 
Cohort (%) 
  1945-54 25.1 24.6 
1955-64 43.6 43.7 
1965-74 31.4 31.7 
Missing 0.0 0.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 
   Gender (%) 
  Male 48.2 48.3 
Female 51.8 51.7 
Missing 0.0 0.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 
   Educational attainment (%) 
  Upper secondary or higher 41.1 41.7 
Tertiary 24.7 25.0 
Missing 0.0 0.0 
   Parental class [EGP] (%) 
    higher salariat (I) 9.7 10.8 
  lower salariat (II) 20.5 22.5 
  qualified routine non-manual workers (IIIa) 5.3 5.7 
  self-employed and farmers (IVabc) 10.4 11.5 
  skilled manual workers, technicians (V+VI) 18.1 20.0 
  unqualified manual workers (VIIa) 20.8 22.2 
  unqualified routine non-manual workers (VIIb) 6.9 7.3 
Missing 8.4 0.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 
   Parental status [0-1] 
    mean 0.45 0.46 
  s.d. 0.16 0.16 
Missing (%) 8.9 0.00 
   Parental education [0-1] 
    mean 0.28 0.28 
  s.d. 0.38 0.38 
Missing (%) 5.5 0.00 
   N 6622 5743 
 
 
Table A6.4: Descriptive statistics for the whole and the analytical samples (%), ITALY 
  
Whole 
sample 
Analytical 
sample 
Cohort (%) 
  1939-53 36.7 34.7 
1954-64 30.9 31.3 
1965-75 32.5 33.9 
Missing 0.0 0.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 
   Gender (%) 
  Male 49.1 48.9 
Female 50.9 51.1 
Missing 0.0 0.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 
   Educational attainment (%) 
  Upper secondary or higher 47.9 49.9 
Tertiary 11.2 11.9 
Missing 0.3 0.0 
   Parental class [ESEC] (%) 
    higher salariat (ESEC 1) 0.7 0.8 
  lower salariat (ESEC 2) 5.2 6.4 
  intermediate occupations, lower supervisory (ESEC 3,6) 10.9 13.3 
  self-employed (not in agriculture) (ESEC 4) 16.9 20.6 
  farmers (ESEC 5) 10.8 13.1 
  lower technical and lower services occupations (ESEC 7-8) 17.0 20.8 
  routine occupations (ESEC 9) 20.6 25.1 
Missing 17.9 0.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 
   Parental status [0-1] 
    mean 0.30 0.30 
  s.d. 0.19 0.19 
Missing (%) 17.9 0.0 
   Parental education [0-1] 
    mean 0.26 0.27 
  s.d. 0.30 0.31 
Missing (%) 1.4 0.0 
   N 29301 23992 
 
 
Table A7: Distribution if individuals by highest level education (%)   
    Men     Women   
    
Upper 
secondary 
or higher 
Tertiary N 
  
Upper 
secondary 
or higher 
Tertiary N 
Britain 1946 24.8 8.3 1879 
 
9.9 2.7 1705 
 
1958 28.6 12.3 4182 
 
27.2 9.5 4071 
 
1970 34.7 17.8 4075 
 
32.7 17.5 4236 
         Sweden 1948 36.5 16.9 4037 
 
36.7 16.7 3903 
 
1952 38.4 14.5 3785 
 
41.3 15.0 3736 
 
1967 39.7 13.2 3489 
 
50.0 18.6 3388 
 
1972 45.6 17.4 3308 
 
57.5 28.0 3095 
         Germany 1945-54 38.6 28.6 734 
 
24.7 16.8 679 
 
1955-64 48.0 31.3 1177 
 
38.4 20.1 1335 
 
1965-74 47.7 30.4 863 
 
47.2 22.3 955 
         Italy 1939-53 38.1 10.1  4055 
 
29.8 7.5  4280 
 
1954-64 53.3 12.5 3666  
 
52.0 11.1  3849 
  1965-75 60.8 13.7 
 4011 
  66.8 16.8 
   
4131  
 
 
 
Table A8.1: Descriptive statistics for the three components of social origins, Britain 
  
1946 
cohort 
1958 
cohort 
1970 
cohort 
Parental class [NS-SEC] (%) 
     higher managerial and professional occupations (Class 1) 4.3 5.5 11.5 
  lower managerial and professional occupations (Class 2) 8.1 17.8 20.9 
  intermediate occupations (Class 3) 8.6 16.8 8.6 
  small employers and own account workers (Class 4) 8.3 5.3 12.2 
  lower supervisory and technical occupations (Class 5) 17.9 27.7 19.2 
  routine and semi-routine occupations (Class 6-7) 52.9 26.9 27.6 
Parental status 
     mean 0.30 0.45 0.50 
  s.d. 0.24 0.23 0.24 
Parental education 
     mean 0.27 0.34 0.39 
  s.d. 0.33 0.33 0.33 
 
Table A8.2: Descriptive statistics for the three components of social origins, Sweden 
  
1948 
cohort 
1953 
cohort 
1967 
cohort 
1972 
cohort 
Parental class [EGP] (%) 
      higher salariat (I) 6.5 7.1 11.4 16.3 
  lower salariat (II) 11.0 15.0 20.0 23.1 
  routine non-manual employees (IIIa) 12.5 12.4 18.0 17.0 
  small employers and own account workers (IVabc) 21.5 18.0 13.2 7.2 
  lower supervisory and skilled manual workers (V+VI) 24.3 24.6 20.1 17.9 
  non-skilled workers (VIIab) 24.2 22.8 17.4 18.6 
Parental status 
      Mean 0.37 0.39 0.46 0.48 
  s.d. 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.15 
Parental education 
    
  Mean 0.24 0.28 0.38 0.39 
  s.d. 0.37 0.37 0.32 0.31 
 
 
Table A8.3: Descriptive statistics for the three components of social origins, Germany 
  1945-54 1955-64 1965-74 
Parental class [EGP] (%) 
     higher salariat (I) 8.6 10.8 12.5 
  lower salariat (II) 21.0 22.3 23.9 
  qualified routine non-manual workers (IIIa) 4.8 5.6 6.4 
  self-employed and farmers (IVabc) 13.5 11.3 10.3 
  skilled manual workers, technicians (V+VI) 22.2 19.9 18.3 
  unqualified manual workers (VIIa) 23.1 22.7 20.6 
  unqualified routine non-manual workers (VIIb) 6.7 7.4 7.8 
Parental status 
   
  Mean 0.45 0.45 0.47 
  s.d. 0.15 0.16 0.16 
Parental education 
   
  Mean 0.24 0.27 0.31 
  s.d. 0.37 0.38 0.38 
 
Table A8.4: Descriptive statistics for the three components of social origins, Italy 
  1939-53 1954-64 1965-75 
Parental class [ESeC] (%) 
     higher salariat (ESeC 1) 0.4 0.6 1.5 
  lower salariat (ESeC 2) 4.6 6.5 8.2 
  intermediate occupations, lower supervisory (ESeC 3, 6) 9.9 13.2 16.9 
  self-employed (not in agriculture) (ESeC 4) 17.5 21.2 23.3 
  farmers (ESeC 5) 20.1 11.8 7.1 
  lower technical and lower services occupations (ESeC 7-8) 19.7 21.7 21.0 
  routine occupations (EseC 9) 27.8 25.2 22.2 
Parental status 
     mean 0.27 0.30 0.33
  s.d. 0.17 0.19 0.21 
Parental education 
     mean 0.26 0.25 0.30
  s.d. 0.26 0.30 0.35 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A9: Binary logistic regression of exceeding (or not) two educational thresholds, on parental 
status and education (average marginal effects with standard errors) 
 
Note: Parental class is also included in models. 
         
*: p<0.05; **: p<0.01 
Parental status
  Britain 0.190 [0.024] ** 0.099 [0.017] ** 0.140 [0.021] ** 0.071 [0.015] **
  Sweden 0.282 [0.039] ** 0.128 [0.027] ** 0.239 [0.037] ** 0.137 [0.032] **
  Germany 0.386 [0.107] ** 0.164 [0.062] * 0.357 [0.093] ** 0.257 [0.072] **
  Italy 0.345 [0.046] ** 0.180 [0.028] ** 0.304 [0.043] ** 0.170 [0.026] **
Parental education
  Britain 0.224 [0.012] ** 0.160 [0.010] ** 0.217 [0.011] ** 0.148 [0.009] **
  Sweden 0.215 [0.014] ** 0.111 [0.012] ** 0.215 [0.014] ** 0.143 [0.011] **
  Germany 0.273 [0.025] ** 0.224 [0.023] ** 0.339 [0.020] ** 0.221 [0.019] **
  Italy 0.437 [0.017] ** 0.160 [0.009] ** 0.402 [0.016] ** 0.149 [0.008] **
Men
Higher secondary 
or higher vs. 
lower Degree vs. lower
Higher secondary 
or higher vs. 
lower Degree vs. lower
Women
 
 
Table A10: Binary logistic regression of exceeding (or not) two educational thresholds, on parental 
class (average marginal effects with standard errors) 
 
 
Note: Parental status and education are also included in models. 
       
*: p<0.05; **: p<0.01 
 
Britain
  routine and semi-routine occupations (ref.) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
  lower supervisory and technical occupations 0.060 [0.011] ** 0.018 [0.010] 0.026 [0.010] * 0.017 [0.010]
  small employers and own account workers 0.029 [0.016] 0.026 [0.012] * 0.063 [0.014] ** 0.038 [0.010] **
  intermediate occupations 0.085 [0.014] ** 0.052 [0.011] ** 0.066 [0.013] ** 0.034 [0.010] **
  lower managerial and professional occupations 0.071 [0.015] ** 0.050 [0.011] ** 0.109 [0.013] ** 0.058 [0.009] **
  higher managerial and professional occupations 0.152 [0.020] ** 0.192 [0.018] ** 0.146 [0.016] ** 0.179 [0.015] **
Sweden
  routine and semi-routine occupations (ref.) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
  lower supervisory and technical occupations 0.068 [0.017] ** 0.035 [0.016] * 0.024 [0.011] * 0.008 [0.009]
  small employers and own account workers 0.055 [0.025] * 0.039 [0.018] * 0.104 [0.018] ** 0.053 [0.018] **
  intermediate occupations 0.121 [0.016] ** 0.065 [0.019] ** 0.115 [0.017] ** 0.047 [0.020] *
  lower managerial and professional occupations 0.184 [0.018] ** 0.084 [0.018] ** 0.184 [0.019] ** 0.090 [0.017] **
  higher managerial and professional occupations 0.299 [0.022] ** 0.157 [0.017] ** 0.274 [0.024] ** 0.132 [0.019] **
Germany
  unqualified workers (ref.) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
  unqualified routine non-manual workers 0.111 [0.043] * 0.065 [0.040] 0.099 [0.038] 0.025 [0.033]
  self-employed and farmers -0.103 [0.037] ** -0.030 [0.034] 0.001 [0.035] 0.009 [0.031]
  skilled manual workers, technicians -0.016 [0.028] -0.001 [0.027] -0.018 [0.027] -0.002 [0.025]
  qualified routine non-manual workers 0.133 [0.050] * 0.074 [0.046] 0.049 [0.042] -0.007 [0.034]
  lower salariat 0.110 [0.043] * 0.109 [0.038] ** 0.049 [0.036] 0.047 [0.031]
  higher salariat 0.077 [0.056] 0.087 [0.049] * 0.074 [0.050] 0.025 [0.038]
Italy
  routine occupations (ref.) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
  lower technical and lower services occupations 0.021 [0.012] -0.002 [0.010] 0.015 [0.013] -0.004 [0.009]
  farmers -0.056 [0.014] ** -0.012 [0.011] -0.038 [0.013] ** 0.001 [0.011]
  self-employed (not in agriculture) 0.050 [0.014] ** 0.018 [0.011] 0.103 [0.013] ** 0.053 [0.010] **
  intermediate occupations, lower supervisory 0.053 [0.022] * 0.015 [0.014] 0.078 [0.020] ** 0.047 [0.013] **
  lower salariat 0.068 [0.095] 0.053 [0.032] 0.047 [0.081] 0.096 [0.034] **
  higher salariat 0.037 [0.036] 0.035 [0.021] 0.110 [0.035] ** 0.044 [0.019] *
Men
Higher secondary 
or higher vs. 
lower Degree vs. lower
Higher secondary 
or higher vs. 
lower
Women
Degree vs. lower
 
 
Table A11: Derivation of three parental groups 
  Parental class 
  Britain Sweden Germany Italy 
 
NS-SeC EGP EGP ESeC 
Level 1 1, 2 I, II I, II 1, 2 
     
Level 2 3, 4, 5 III, IV, V-VI 
III, IV, V-
VI 
3, 4, 5, 6 
     
Level 3 6, 7 VII VII 7, 8, 9 
 
Parental status 
  Britain Sweden Germany Italy 
     Level 1 top third 
     
Level 2 middle third 
     
Level 3 bottom third 
 
Parental education 
  Britain Sweden Germany Italy 
     Level 1 tertiary tertiary tertiary tertiary 
   
 
 
Level 2 
below 
tertiary 
below 
tertiary 
below 
tertiary 
below 
tertiary 
   
 
 
Level 3 
no 
qualification 
compulsory 
only 
lower 
secondary 
only 
no 
qualification 
 
 
 
Table A12:  Derivation of combined origins 
Combined origins 
Components of parental 
background 
  class status education 
    Most advantaged Level 1 Level 1 Level 1 
 
Level 1 Level 2 Level 1 
 
Level 1 Level 1 Level 2 
 
Level 2 Level 1 Level 1 
    
Intermediate 
Other combinations of the 
three 
 
components of parental 
background 
    Least advantaged Level 3 Level 3 Level 3 
 
Level 3 Level 2 Level 3 
 
Level 3 Level 3 Level 2 
 Level 2 Level 3 Level 3 
Note: The construction rules of Level 1, 2, and 3 are shown in Table A8.  
 
 
 
 
Notes 
                                               
1 If educational reforms occurred during a decade, we coded the characteristics of the 
educational system prevalent in most of the years of the decade. If reform occurred in the 
middle of a decade, we took the average. 
2
 The individual scores for each sub-dimension, alongside the sources of information are 
presented in Table A5.  
3 The data-sets have some missing values, due to attrition, recall error, etc. The proportions of 
cases lost due to missing values on key variables are the following: Britain, 7%; Sweden, 
between 2 and 7%, depending on survey sweeps; Germany, around 10%; Italy, around 18%. 
For all four countries, we conducted statistical tests of various kinds to check whether or not 
missing values on our key variables can be taken as random. Our results, in all four cases, are 
affirmative (available upon request). Furthermore, to illustrate that missing values are, 
indeed, missing at random, Tables A6.1-6.4 show the distributions of all of our variables, 
separately for the whole and for the analytical sample. Moreover, in auxiliary analyses we 
were able to demonstrate that, in the British and the Italian cases, results from analyses using 
data produced by multiple imputation do not differ significantly from those from analyses 
using ‘complete cases’, regarding the relationship between cohort members’ social origins 
and their educational attainment.   
4 The correlation between the CAMSIS and the Chan-Goldthorpe scales is high, 0.9.  
5
 Although the three components of parental background are obviously correlated with each 
other (the highest level of correlation – between 0.52 and 0.72 – shows up between parental 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
class and parental status in all four countries and in all cohorts alike), a problem of 
multicollinearity never arises. 
6 The main difference between the binary logistic and the transitions – or Mare – models is 
that the former is concerned with inequalities in the odds of exceeding or not any particular 
educational thresholds, while the latter is concerned with inequalities in the odds of making 
a given transition, conditional on being at risk of doing so. As Breen at al. (2009) show, the 
results from the two approaches lead to generally similar conclusions, regarding over-time 
trends.    
7 The gross effects of parental class in fact show up in the same fashion in all four countries: 
the highest AME is observed for the higher salariat. But there is country variation in the 
pattern of the net effects of parental class, due to country differences in the relationship 
between parental class, status and education.  
8 To check whether the effects of social origins change across cohorts, we included 
interactions between the three parental characteristics and cohorts. We refer to ‘changes’ of 
the effects of social origins only in cases where these interactions were statistically 
significant.  
